A murder charge is not automatically a no-bail offense: court orders a new detention hearing with section 12(b) findings
California pretrial detention without bail depends on the findings the state Constitution requires. In In re Sanchez, a partially published Third District opinion on transfer from the Supreme Court, the court held that a murder charge is not automatically a qualifying offense under article I, section 12(b), found that this charge qualified on its record, and vacated the detention orders because the trial court never made section 12(b)’s required findings.
What happened in In re Sanchez
The petitioner was charged in Sacramento County in February 2025 with second degree murder and possession of fentanyl for sale. The prosecution’s theory was that she sold fentanyl to a buyer who died of fentanyl intoxication, knowing the drug’s deadly danger from prior personal experience. The trial court denied her motions for release three times in 2025. As the Court of Appeal described those rulings, they rested on the risk to public safety that she would continue to sell fentanyl and on the absence of any less restrictive means than custody.
She petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of habeas corpus in December 2025, and the court summarily denied the petition. In March 2026 the California Supreme Court granted review and sent the case back with directions to issue an order to show cause on whether she was charged with a qualifying felony under section 12(b). The Supreme Court then decided In re Kowalczyk (2026) 19 Cal.5th 593, clarifying that for noncapital offenses pretrial release may be denied only if the requirements of section 12(b) or 12(c) are met, and the Court of Appeal expanded its order to all three clauses of section 12(b).
What does section 12(b) require before bail is denied?
Section 12(b) has three clauses. The charged felony must be an offense “involving acts of violence” or a crime of sexual assault “on another person.” The evidence in the record must be sufficient to sustain a conviction of that offense. And the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, a substantial likelihood that release would result in great bodily harm to others.
Is a murder charge automatically a no-bail offense in California?
No. The People argued that because second degree murder is a violent felony under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c), it automatically qualifies. The court disagreed. Section 12(b) does not use the term “violent felony” that section 667.5(c) defines. As first introduced, the constitutional amendment listed specific crimes, including murder, but the Legislature struck the list and adopted the broad language voters approved. And some offenses on the section 667.5(c) list do not necessarily involve acts of violence on another person. Courts have called section 12(b) the “violent felony exception,” but as the court put it, “Judicially ascribed labels do not change substantive law.” The court must review the record to decide whether the charged felony meets the constitutional criteria.
Can a fatal drug sale be a felony “involving acts of violence”?
On this record, yes. The petitioner argued that she used no force and administered nothing. The court accepted that no one alleged an assaultive act, but noted that section 12(b) does not say the act of violence must be done by a person. Reading the provision broadly, it held that “when a substance produces an effect of physical force on a person’s body such that it injures, abuses, damages, or destroys them, it constitutes an act of violence on that person.” Under In re O’Connor (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 90, a felony “involves” such an act when it is “related closely” to it, and an implied-malice murder charge alleging a knowing sale of the drug that caused the death met that test.
The court limited its ruling: “Our holding thus does not render every sale of an illegal drug that results in the purchaser’s death following the purchaser’s self-administered ingestion of the drug a qualifying offense under section 12(b).” It also declined to address the petitioner’s causation arguments, including the gap between sale and death and the buyer’s self-administration, under the first clause, explaining that proximate cause belongs to the second clause, which tests the strength of the case.
Why the detention orders were vacated
The trial court had denied release on public-safety grounds and because it found no less restrictive means to protect the public. Those findings, the court explained, belong to separate analyses under article I, section 28, subdivision (f)(3) and In re Humphrey, and they “do not supplant the findings required under section 12(b) before a trial court may deny pretrial release.” Denying release without first finding that the section 12(b) requirements were met was an abuse of discretion.
The court vacated the orders and directed a new detention/release hearing, consistent with Kowalczyk, to consider “whether the record contains evidence of second degree murder sufficient to sustain a hypothetical verdict of guilt and whether clear and convincing evidence establishes a substantial likelihood that Sanchez’s release will result in great bodily harm to others.” It first rejected the People’s timeliness objection and deemed the petition timely; that part of the opinion is not published.
Justice Boulware Eurie wrote the opinion, joined by Presiding Justice Earl. Justice Mesiwala concurred, disagreeing that a controlled substance can perform an act of violence and concluding that second degree murder qualifies as a matter of law: “Killing – however accomplished – is inherently violent.”
What this decision means in practice
The decision separates two kinds of findings. A judge’s concern about public safety does not replace the findings section 12(b) requires before release can be denied. And arguments about causation go to the strength of the evidence, not to whether the charge is a qualifying offense. Here the challenge came by habeas petition and took nearly a year, with a summary denial, review in the Supreme Court and a transfer back. For more, see our criminal appeals and writs practice.
Key takeaways
- A murder charge is not automatically a qualifying offense for denial of bail under article I, section 12(b); the court must look at the charge and the record.
- Section 12(b) does not incorporate the Penal Code section 667.5(c) list of violent felonies.
- On this record, an implied-malice murder charge based on a knowing sale of fentanyl that caused the buyer’s death qualified, though the court stressed that not every fatal drug sale will.
- Public-safety and less-restrictive-means findings do not replace section 12(b)’s required findings, and denying release without them was an abuse of discretion.
Why this case shows the value of appellate counsel
If you or a family member is being held without bail, this decision shows how much turns on the findings in the record. The petition here was filed in December 2025 and decided in November 2026, after a summary denial, a grant of review in the Supreme Court and a transfer back. The relief was a new hearing, because the question was what the trial court had and had not found. Challenging a detention order means identifying the findings the Constitution requires, showing which are missing, and framing the petition so the reviewing court can act. That is appellate work, and timing matters once an order is made.
What this post is not. This post is attorney advertising and general information about a court decision. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case turns on its own facts and record, and appellate deadlines are short and often jurisdictional — talk to appellate counsel about your case promptly.
Facing a ruling you may need to appeal or challenge by writ? Yisrael Gelb · yisrael@gelblawapc.com · (323) 632-6864