Writ granted: rental-car excess policy's intoxication exclusion enforced, and summary judgment ordered for the insurer

A rental-car excess liability policy's intoxication exclusion was enforceable, the Fourth District, Division Two held in Ace American Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, an unpublished opinion, because the policy sat above Avis's approved self-insurance. The court also held that all but one of the trial court's “triable issues” were questions of law, and the remaining one was undisputed, and it directed entry of summary judgment for the insurer by writ of mandate.

What happened

In February 2016, a driver rented a car from Avis in California and bought optional additional liability insurance through Avis's program. Ace American Insurance Company wrote that coverage. The driver drove the rental car while under the influence of alcohol and was involved in a collision that killed Michael Gouin. His parents sued the driver and Avis, and in 2020 his mother obtained a default judgment against the driver for about $1.9 million. She assigned the judgment to Michael's sister, Michelle Gouin, and the driver assigned her rights against Ace and Avis to Michelle as well.

In 2022, Michelle sued Ace and Avis. Her claims against Ace rested on the allegation that the Ace policy provided primary automobile liability insurance. Ace moved for summary judgment on the ground that its policy contains an intoxication exclusion and that such an exclusion is valid in an excess policy. Michelle cross-moved for summary adjudication, arguing the policy operated as primary coverage. The San Bernardino County Superior Court (Judge Winston Keh) denied both motions, listing six supposed triable issues of fact, including whether the policy was primary or excess and whether the exclusion was enforceable. Ace petitioned for a writ of mandate.

Primary or excess: why the answer decides coverage

Insurance Code section 11580.1 sets out the exclusions permitted in a primary automobile policy, and driving under the influence is not among them. Citing Hertz Corp. v. Home Ins. Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1071, the court explained that an excess policy is not subject to those limits if it requires underlying insurance or a retained limit of self-insurance at least equal to the Vehicle Code section 16056 minimums. So everything turned on whether the Ace policy was excess.

Were these really triable issues of fact?

No. The Court of Appeal reviewed the ruling independently and held:

“All but one of the purported factual disputes identified by the trial court are issues of policy interpretation and hence are pure questions of law, e.g., whether the Ace policy operates as a primary or excess policy or whether the exclusion for driving while intoxicated is enforceable.”

The only truly factual issue, which version of the rental agreement the driver signed, was not disputed, because Ace assumed for purposes of its motion that the version Michelle alleged governed. “The disputed issues presented by Ace’s motion were legal.”

How the court read the policy

The declarations page calls the policy an “Excess Rental Liability Policy,” and the court found the title accurate. The insuring agreement promises to pay sums in excess of those payable under the “Underlying Protection,” and the policy defines that term to include “an approved program of self-insurance of substantially similar scope, that meets or exceeds minimum motor vehicle liability requirements.” It was undisputed that Avis was an authorized self-insurer under California's financial responsibility law for the rental period.

Michelle argued that the policy could not be excess, because the rental agreement states that it provides no insurance, so the Ace coverage had to be treated as primary. The court disagreed. The policy does not identify the rental agreement as the primary coverage; it is excess to the “Underlying Protection,” which can be self-insurance. The declarations measure Ace's limit from the protection “shown in Rental Agreement,” but the court held that this establishes only the amount of Ace's limit, not that the policy is primary. The court concluded:

“Avis’s approved program of self-insurance provided primary coverage, so the Ace policy was indeed an excess policy; it was not ‘excess to nothing.’ And because it was an excess policy, the intoxicated driver exclusion is enforceable.”

Because every claim depended on coverage under the Ace policy, the court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order, grant Ace's motion for summary judgment, and enter judgment for Ace.

What it means in practice

This opinion is unpublished and cannot be cited in California courts (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a)), but its method is familiar. A list of “triable issues” that are really questions of contract interpretation does not defeat summary judgment, and the Court of Appeal can say so on independent review. The case also shows that some trial-court rulings reach the Court of Appeal by writ petition rather than by appeal; our post on appealable versus writ-only orders explains the difference, and our note on summary judgment rulings covers related ground.

Key takeaways

  • The court held that whether the Ace policy was primary or excess, and whether its exclusion was enforceable, were questions of law, not triable issues of fact.
  • Because the policy defined its underlying protection to include an approved self-insurance program, and Avis had one, the rental-car policy was excess.
  • As an excess policy, it could enforce an intoxicated-driver exclusion that a primary auto policy could not include.
  • The court granted writ relief and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment for the insurer.
  • The opinion is unpublished and cannot be cited in California courts under rule 8.1115(a).

Why this case shows the value of appellate counsel

For a party facing an order that denies summary judgment on supposed fact disputes, this decision shows that the label the trial court uses is not the end of the matter. Here the insurer persuaded the Court of Appeal, through a writ petition, that the issues were legal and that the policy's plain language resolved them. A writ petition is a separate proceeding with its own requirements, and deciding whether and how to seek that review calls for appellate counsel. Learn more about our writ practice.

What this post is not. This post is attorney advertising and general information about a court decision. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case turns on its own facts and record, and appellate deadlines are short and often jurisdictional — talk to appellate counsel about your case promptly.

Yisrael Gelb is the founder of Gelb Law APC, a California appellate and motion practice in Beverly Hills handling civil and criminal appeals, writs, and post-trial motions. About the firm · State Bar profile

Facing a ruling you may need to appeal or challenge by writ? Yisrael Gelb · yisrael@gelblawapc.com · (323) 632-6864

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