After 120 days, a trial court cannot resentence on its own motion without a change in applicable sentencing law

Section 1172.1 resentencing on a court’s own motion has a limit, and People v. Bray enforces it. More than 120 days after commitment, a trial court may act on its own only when the sentencing laws applicable at the original sentencing have changed. The Second District found no such change and reversed an order that had replaced a life-without-parole sentence with 15 years to life.

What happened

In 1998 the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, with two special-circumstance findings, and conspiracy to commit murder. The sentence was life without the possibility of parole on the murder count and 25 years to life on the conspiracy count, stayed under Penal Code section 654. The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal in 1999.

In November 2024, through counsel, the defendant asked the trial court to resentence her to a parole-eligible term under section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). The People opposed, and the court held a hearing with witness testimony. It then found it had discretion under the statute and, on its own motion and over the People’s objection, reduced the convictions to second degree murder and conspiracy to commit second degree murder, with terms of 15 years to life and the conspiracy term stayed. The People appealed from the order dated October 20, 2025. The Court of Appeal said they could: “The People may properly appeal from the trial court’s order.”

When can a court resentence on its own motion under section 1172.1?

Reviewing the question of statutory interpretation de novo, the court read subdivision (a)(1) to allow a court to act on its own motion in two situations: within 120 days of the date of commitment, or if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed. The 120 days were long gone, so everything depended on a change in law, and not just any change. It has to be a change in “applicable sentencing laws.” The statute, the court said,

“does not allow a trial court to resentence a defendant at any time if there has been a change in any sentencing laws.”

Special-circumstance first degree murder carried death or life without parole in 1998, and it still does.

Why the claimed changes in the law did not qualify

The defense offered a series of changes, and the court worked through them:

• Other ameliorative statutes. None of the laws cited, such as Senate Bills 620 and 1393 or section 1172.75, applied to this sentence.
• The AB 600 amendments to section 1172.1 itself. Subdivision (a)(3)(B) was not an independent source of power. “Resentencing authority under subdivision (a)(3)(B) does not arise independently, however.” A court becomes a resentencing court only after subdivision (a)(1) is satisfied. And in the court’s summary, “section 1172.1 conferred no statutory authority, in itself, for the trial court to resentence Bray.”
• Section 3051. Subdivision (h) excludes life-without-parole sentences for offenses committed after age 18. The court did not decide whether section 3051 is a change in sentencing law at all.
• Section 1170. This was not a determinate sentence, and the amendments did not change it.
• Section 1016.7 and charging directives. Section 1016.7 is not a sentencing law and would not have given the sentencing court new discretion. The district attorney’s charging directives are not changes to applicable sentencing laws and do not alter the court’s sentencing choices.
• People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223. The decision did not change the conspiracy sentence, which stayed at 25 years to life. “Cortez had no effect on Bray’s sentence.”

The defense also pointed to age, rehabilitation and the science on young adult culpability. Of the young-adult case law and science, the court said that “while these legal developments may be relevant to some defendants’ sentences, they do not affect Bray’s.” Its conclusion was that “the trial court lacked authority to recall her original sentence and resentence her.” As for the reduced conspiracy count, the People contended and the defendant conceded that, under Cortez, there is no crime of conspiracy to commit second degree murder.

What the court did not decide, and what remains

The court did not reach the People’s arguments under section 1385.1 or on separation of powers. It noted that the separation-of-powers claim had not been raised in the trial court, and that courts avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings.

The statute does leave another route. Resentencing may occur “at any time upon the recommendation” of a relevant correctional or prosecuting authority, with no change in law required. The opinion also notes that a defendant is not entitled to file a petition for relief under section 1172.1 and that the court need not respond to one.

The disposition: “The trial court’s October 20, 2025 order is reversed.” On remand, the trial court must enter an order “confirming that Bray’s original judgment and sentence remain in effect.”

Why this case shows the value of appellate counsel

For anyone facing a similar ruling, on either side, Bray shows that an own-motion resentencing order depends first on authority. Here a favorable order was reversed for lack of statutory authority, without any weighing of the hearing evidence. Appellate review here turned on statutory text and the difference between applicable laws and other laws. Because the statute also separates own-motion relief from the recommendation route, an early question on appeal is which path the order took. Sorting out those questions, and identifying which sentencing change actually touches a given sentence, is the work of appellate counsel on a criminal appeal.

Facing a ruling you may need to appeal or challenge by writ? Yisrael Gelb · yisrael@gelblawapc.com · (323) 632-6864

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