Court of Appeal affirms judgment on demurrer against an SVP patient's section 5325 challenge to hospital mail inspection

Whether Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 gives a patient held under the Sexually Violent Predator Act a right to unopened mail was the question in Seeboth v. State Dept. of State Hospitals. The Fifth District affirmed the judgment after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, concluding that the statute and a regulation allowing staff to inspect mail for contraband are not in conflict.

What happened in Seeboth v. State Dept. of State Hospitals

Seeboth is a patient at Coalinga State Hospital, held as a sexually violent predator under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. He alleged that a December 26, 2023 memo from the hospital police chief defined a policy, effective January 8, 2024, of x-raying incoming patient mail and opening it outside patients’ presence. The memo cited “multiple incidents of illicit and unknown substances within patient mail” as the reason. Seeboth alleged that his mail was opened outside his presence on or about May 8, 2024.

He filed an amended petition for declaratory relief on February 18, 2025. He asked the Fresno County Superior Court to declare a right to send and receive unopened mail under section 5325 and to determine whether California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 884, subdivision (b)(6) conflicts with that statute and with two title 22 regulations. The trial court sustained the respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend.

Does section 5325 give every state hospital patient a right to unopened mail?

Section 5325 lists rights that include the right “to mail and receive unopened correspondence.” Seeboth relied on its second sentence, which begins “[e]ach person committed to a state hospital,” and read that language as giving him the listed rights. He argued that section 884 was therefore invalid.

The court reviewed the demurrer de novo and did not accept that reading. Its reasoning ran through three layers:

• Separate commitment systems. Case law distinguishes conservatees under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act from other classes of civilly committed individuals, and those classes need not be treated identically.
• The 2012 amendment. The court said Seeboth “points to no authority or legislative history to support his argument.” The court said the Legislature’s stated intent in 2012 was to replace “mental retardation” language, and described two of the bills as aimed at that change “without such changes being construed as substantive changes in law.”
• What the Legislature did elsewhere. Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (g) gives mentally disordered offenders these rights, subject to modification for reasonable security. The Sexually Violent Predator Act has no comparable provision, and the court inferred that the Legislature did not intend to give such patients LPS-equivalent rights.

The court concluded that “Seeboth has not established that the rights afforded individuals under the LPS Act apply” to every committed person without limitation.

Do the mail statute and the hospital regulation conflict?

Section 884(b)(6) lists a non-LPS patient’s right to mail, subject to denial for good cause, and provides for staff to “open and inspect all incoming and outgoing mail addressed to and from patients for contraband.” Applying the presumption against implied repeal, the court concluded that section 5325 and section 884 “can be harmonized such that they are not in conflict.” Section 5325 can be read to apply to LPS patients. Even if it reaches others, the court explained, its rights are not unlimited, because the department may adopt regulations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 4005.1 to ensure safety and limit contraband.

The title 22 argument failed as well. Those regulations apply to intermediate care facilities and acute psychiatric hospitals, and the court said Seeboth “is a non-LPS patient whose rights are set forth in Regulations title 9, not title 22.” The disposition reads: “The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.”

The opinion does not decide a First Amendment claim. It recounts that Seeboth said any such claim was not part of his request for declaratory relief.

What this means for challenges to state regulations

This is not my usual field, which is part of why I find the opinion useful. Three points carry beyond state hospitals. Classification comes first: broad words in a statute did not settle which class of person it protects. An amendment needs its history: this one was read against the stated legislative intent, which the court did not treat as a substantive expansion. And a regulation challenge can end at the demurrer stage when the court finds the statute and the regulation can be read together.

Why this case shows the value of appellate counsel

A demurrer sustained without leave to amend ends a case on legal grounds. The appellate court reviews the pleading de novo and asks whether there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. Here that review reached the 2012 bills and their legislative history, a Penal Code provision, decisions distinguishing commitment schemes, and two titles of the California Code of Regulations. Anyone facing a similar ruling on a statute or regulation faces that kind of analysis on appeal. Appellate counsel traces that history, frames the question for de novo review, and addresses whether the defect could be cured by amendment. An appellate lawyer can look at a ruling like this one before the time to appeal runs.

Facing a ruling you may need to appeal or challenge by writ? Yisrael Gelb · yisrael@gelblawapc.com · (323) 632-6864

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