Representative Matters

A sampling of recent engagements.

The matters below include published Court of Appeal opinions in which Gelb Law APC served as counsel of record, recent trial-court motion practice (both as counsel of record and on a consulting basis for retained firms), and a candid section on appeals we lost. Each entry links to the court ruling or filed brief. Past results do not guarantee a similar result in any other matter.

Appellate engagements

Counsel of record on appeal.

Matters in which Gelb Law APC briefed and argued the appeal as counsel of record. The opinions and filed briefs below identify the parties by name as a matter of public record.

Court of Appeal Fourth District · Division One

Baird v. PulteGroup, Inc. — partial reversal of summary judgment for plaintiffs/appellants

Represented Mark Baird, a United States military veteran, and his husband Bradley Baird on appeal from a defense summary judgment in a FEHA action arising from a new-home purchase. The defendants’ uniform policy capped buyer upgrades at ten percent of the base sales price — but allowed VA loan borrowers only the ten percent the VA would finance, while non-VA buyers could exceed the cap by paying cash. The Court of Appeal reversed as to Pulte Home Company and sales manager Brett Picano, holding that triable issues remained on whether the policy reflected unlawful veteran-status discrimination under FEHA and whether the defendants engaged in a sustained pattern of discriminatory conduct.

Issue: Whether a facially neutral upgrade-cap policy applied differently to VA-loan borrowers raises triable issues of veteran-status discrimination under FEHA
Posture: Plaintiffs/appellants on appeal from summary judgment for defendants
Standard: De novo
Result: MSJ reversed in part; remanded. Trial continues against Pulte Home Company and Brett Picano (June 2, 2026).
Citation: Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Div. One, No. D085988 (unpublished); from Riverside County Super. Ct. No. CVPS2201015 (Hon. Manuel Bustamante, Jr.)

Read the Court of Appeal opinion (PDF) →

Court of Appeal · Appointed appellate counsel Second District · Division Four

People v. Perelman — judgment reversed and remanded for resentencing

Appointed by the Court of Appeal to represent the defendant/appellant on a two-count vandalism conviction under Penal Code section 594(a). The opening brief raised two issues: (1) that the trial court erred in admitting surveillance-video recordings of the underlying incidents without adequate authentication, and (2) that the court erred in imposing mandatory supervision on the misdemeanor count. The Court of Appeal rejected the authentication challenge but agreed on the sentencing issue, reversed the judgment, and remanded for resentencing.

Issue: (1) Authentication of surveillance video under Evidence Code § 1401 et seq.; (2) whether mandatory supervision may be imposed on a misdemeanor conviction
Posture: Defendant/appellant on appeal from judgment of conviction
Standard: Abuse of discretion (evidentiary) / de novo (sentencing legality)
Result: Judgment reversed; remanded for resentencing (May 26, 2026)
Citation: Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div. Four, No. B343120 (unpublished); from Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LA099813 (Hon. Gregory A. Dohi)

Read the Court of Appeal opinion (PDF) →

Court of Appeal Fourth District · Division Three

Turner v. Insight Global, LLC — affirmance for respondent on appeal

Represented the plaintiff/respondent in a Court of Appeal challenge to the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The employer-defendant offered an unsigned "Contract Employee Agreement" and a declaration from its associate general counsel attempting to authenticate an electronic signature. We argued — and the Court of Appeal agreed — that under the Iyere / Ruiz burden-shifting framework, the employer failed to carry its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a valid arbitration agreement existed. The trial court's order denying the motion to compel was affirmed, and our client recovered costs on appeal.

Issue: Whether employer met its burden of authenticating an electronic signature on an arbitration agreement under the FAA and CAA
Posture: Respondent on appeal from order denying motion to compel arbitration
Standard: De novo (existence of agreement) / abuse of discretion (evidentiary rulings)
Result: Affirmed; respondent to recover costs on appeal (Dec. 15, 2025)
Citation: Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Div. Three, No. G064160 (unpublished)

Read the Court of Appeal opinion (PDF) →

Court of Appeal Second District · Division Two

Hathorne v. City of Los Angeles — case settled after opening brief filed

Drafted, on a consulting basis for retained counsel, the appellant's opening brief in a Court of Appeal challenge to the trial court's denial of a motion to vacate a dismissal under the Stiles/Aldrich three-part test. The case had been dismissed at an OSC re: settlement after a calendaring error by trial counsel — despite a signed $400,000 settlement agreement between Ms. Hathorne and the City of Los Angeles. The opening brief argued that the trial court applied the wrong test to a non-final order under Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, and that all three Stiles/Aldrich prongs were satisfied on the record. The City reopened settlement discussions after the AOB was filed and the case resolved before the respondent's brief was due.

Issue: Whether the trial court applied the proper test (Stiles/Aldrich vs. extrinsic-mistake / Rappleyea) to a motion to vacate a non-final dismissal order
Posture: Appellant on appeal from order denying motion to vacate dismissal
Standard: Abuse of discretion / de novo (legal test applied)
Result: Case settled after appellant's opening brief filed (March 2025)
Citation: Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div. Two, No. B337804

Read the appellant's opening brief (PDF) →

Court of Appeal Second District · Division Four

Janisse v. MLK-LA Healthcare — affirmance of cost-order denial on cross-appeal

Retained to brief the FEHA cost-allocation cross-appeal in a consolidated appellate matter against Martin Luther King Jr. – Los Angeles Healthcare Corporation. After a defense verdict at trial, MLK moved for its full memorandum of costs without allocating between FEHA and non-FEHA claims — a prerequisite under Roman v. BRE Properties (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, absent a finding the FEHA claims were frivolous. The trial court denied the cost motion outright, and MLK cross-appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed: a prevailing FEHA defendant must allocate costs in its moving papers, and a trial court does not abuse its discretion by declining to perform the allocation itself or invite supplemental briefing. The main appeal — briefed by separate co-counsel — was affirmed against the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether a prevailing FEHA defendant must allocate costs between FEHA and non-FEHA claims in its moving papers, or whether the trial court must allocate sua sponte
Posture: Plaintiff/respondent on MLK's cross-appeal from post-judgment order denying costs
Standard: Abuse of discretion
Result: Post-judgment cost order affirmed; parties to bear their own costs on appeal (Sept. 3, 2025). The main appeal, briefed by separate counsel, was affirmed against plaintiff.
Citation: Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div. Four, Nos. B326593 / B328707 (consolidated)

Read the Court of Appeal opinion (PDF) →

Trial-court motion practice

The motion that ends the case.

Recent California Superior Court rulings on dispositive motions — some as counsel of record, some as consulting brief writer for the retained firm. The first entry below is a counsel-of-record engagement where the parties are identified by name; the consulting matters that follow are summarized with names redacted.

Counsel of record · § 128.7 motion LA Superior · Santa Monica, Dept. P

Bunker v. Pineda — terminating sanctions and monetary sanctions granted for defense

Represented the defendants — a valet-service company and its owner — in a personal-injury action arising from a golf-cart rollover at a corporate event. After discovery (including the owner's deposition, video of the accident, and the actual driver's declaration) established that neither defendant was driving the cart and the plaintiffs had refused to dismiss, we served and filed a Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7 motion for terminating and monetary sanctions. The court rejected plaintiffs' rental-contract argument under Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, found the action objectively unreasonable after the owner's deposition under Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, granted terminating sanctions dismissing both defendants with prejudice, and ordered the plaintiffs and their counsel jointly and severally to pay $6,229.82 in fees and costs.

Issue: Whether plaintiffs and their counsel had a reasonable basis under § 128.7(b)(3) to maintain a negligence action after discovery established that neither defendant operated the vehicle
Posture: Moving defendants on motion for terminating and monetary sanctions
Standard: Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7 (objective reasonableness)
Result: Motion granted; defendants dismissed with prejudice; plaintiffs and counsel ordered jointly and severally to pay $6,229.82 in fees and costs (April 1, 2026)
Citation: Bunker v. Pineda, LASC, West Dist., Santa Monica, Dept. P, No. 25SMCV00869 (Hon. David W. Swift)

Read the court's ruling (PDF) →

Consulting brief · MSJ opposition San Diego Superior · Central

Drafted opposition that defeated defendant's MSJ in a premises matter

Drafted, on a consulting basis for the retained firm, the plaintiff's opposition to a motion for summary judgment in a premises action against the operator of a major mixed-use property and an affiliated mall owner. The strategy turned on obtaining a stipulation to amend, filing a first amended complaint, and arguing that the pending MSJ was directed to a superseded pleading and was therefore moot under State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124. The opposition also targeted a co-defendant's purported joinder, which failed to comply with the notice and separate-statement requirements of CCP § 437c and local rules. The court denied the MSJ outright.

Issue: Whether an MSJ directed to a superseded complaint survives the filing of an amended pleading
Posture: Plaintiff opposing summary judgment
Standard: CCP § 437c
Result: MSJ denied; joinder rejected (Apr. 17, 2026)

Read the court's ruling (PDF) →

Consulting brief · MSJ opposition San Diego Superior · North County

Drafted opposition that defeated bar's MSJ on a premises-liability claim

Drafted, on a consulting basis for the retained firm, the plaintiff's opposition to summary judgment in a personal-injury action against a San Diego nightclub arising from a patron-on-patron assault. The bar moved on the statutory immunity for alcohol service under Business & Professions Code § 25602 and Civil Code § 1714. The opposition refocused the analysis on the special-relationship doctrine recognized in Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224 and Saatzer v. Smith (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 512, arguing the establishment failed to provide adequate security to police the premises, and was supported by expert testimony from a nightclub security consultant. The court found a triable issue of material fact on the adequacy of staffing and denied the motion.

Issue: Whether a bar's statutory alcohol-service immunity bars a premises-liability claim grounded in the special-relationship doctrine
Posture: Plaintiff opposing summary judgment
Standard: CCP § 437c · special-relationship doctrine
Result: MSJ denied; case proceeds to trial (Feb. 20, 2026)

Read the court's ruling (PDF) →

Consulting brief · MSJ opposition LA Superior · Department 28

Drafted opposition that defeated motorist's MSJ in a bicycle-vs-car case

Drafted, on a consulting basis for the retained firm, the plaintiff bicyclist's opposition to summary judgment in a negligence action against a motorist who turned into a diagonal parking space across the plaintiff's path of travel. The defendant moved on three theories: presumptive negligence from a rear-end collision, no duty owed, and lack of breach. The opposition raised triable issues on whether the motorist checked her mirrors, signaled, looked over her shoulder before turning, and "darted" in front of the plaintiff, and countered the defendant's "avoidability" framing as a thinly disguised last-clear-chance argument — a doctrine abolished in California since Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804. The court held the defendant failed to meet her initial burden and, alternatively, that triable issues existed on all four duty-and-breach theories.

Issue: Whether a rear-end presumption and "avoidability" framing entitle a motorist to summary judgment in a bicycle-vs-car case
Posture: Plaintiff opposing summary judgment
Standard: CCP § 437c · comparative negligence (Li v. Yellow Cab)
Result: MSJ denied (Nov. 15, 2024)

Read the court's ruling (PDF) →

Hard cases

Appeals we lost — and would take again.

Appellate practice is a long game. Some of the most important arguments are the ones that move the law a little, or set up the next case, even when the panel does not go your way. The matters below are losses. They are here because the issues were worth raising, the records were worth preserving, and a serious appellate practice should be honest about that.

Court of Appeal · Affirmed Second District · Division One

Macias v. The Vons Companies — affirmance on demurrer dismissals

Represented Joseph Macias in a Court of Appeal challenge to dismissals entered after successive demurrers were sustained without leave in a slip-and-fall premises action against Vons and adjacent commercial tenants. The appeal raised three questions: whether the demurrer rulings were appealable, whether the appeal from the judgments was timely, and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to vacate the dismissals under CCP § 473(b). The Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying § 473(b) relief and dismissed the demurrer appeals on jurisdictional grounds — one as non-appealable, one as untimely.

Issue: Whether successive demurrer rulings and § 473(b) relief can support reversal where appellate-deadline and amendment-procedure errors compound at the trial level
Posture: Plaintiff/appellant from judgments and order denying motion to vacate
Standard: Abuse of discretion (§ 473(b)) / de novo (jurisdiction)
Result: Affirmed in part; dismissed in part (March 23, 2026)
Citation: Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div. One, No. B344639
Why this issue mattered: Mr. Macias was injured in a store he walked into as a customer, and he spent years trying to be heard on what happened to him. By the time the case reached the Court of Appeal, the fight was no longer about the fall — it was about whether procedural deadlines and a denied motion to vacate would extinguish his claim before any court weighed the merits. The appeal sat at the intersection of three rules that quietly close the courthouse door: which demurrer rulings are appealable, when the 60-day clock starts after a dismissal, and how much room § 473(b) leaves a litigant whose trial-level representation has broken down. He was entitled to have those questions pressed, fully and on the record, before being told no — and losing the appeal does not change that he was right to ask.

Read the Court of Appeal opinion (PDF) →

Court of Appeal · Affirmed Fourth District · Division One

Davis v. Corvel Corporation — affirmance on workers'-compensation exclusivity

Represented Brianna Davis, a former EMT, in a Court of Appeal challenge to the sustaining of demurrers — without further leave to amend — on workers' compensation exclusivity grounds. The third amended complaint alleged that a workers' comp claims administrator, an adjuster, and a treating physician engaged in conduct that fell outside the compensation bargain. The Court of Appeal applied Vacanti v. State Compensation Insurance Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800 and concluded the claims, as pleaded, were precluded by exclusivity and that no further amendment would cure the defect. The orders of dismissal were affirmed.

Issue: Whether claims against a workers' comp claims administrator, adjuster, and treating physician fall outside the exclusivity doctrine under Vacanti
Posture: Plaintiff/appellant from orders of dismissal after demurrers sustained without leave
Standard: De novo (demurrer) / abuse of discretion (denial of leave)
Result: Affirmed (April 20, 2026)
Citation: Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Div. One, No. D085457
Why this issue mattered: Ms. Davis was an EMT — someone who answered other people's emergencies for a living — and she came to the courts believing she had been mistreated by the very system meant to take care of her after she was hurt on the job. To her, workers' compensation exclusivity was not a doctrine; it was a wall between her experience and a courtroom willing to hear it. Vacanti is a powerful gatekeeper, and its reach into claims against adjusters, administrators, and treating providers shapes what every injured worker can bring outside the comp system. Pressing the limits of that doctrine on her behalf was about insisting that an injured worker still has a voice the law has to answer, even when the answer is no.

Read the Court of Appeal opinion (PDF) →

Court of Appeal · Affirmed Second District · Division Four

People v. Li — affirmance on felony-vandalism sufficiency challenge

Court-appointed appellate counsel for the defendant on direct appeal from two felony-vandalism convictions under Penal Code § 594. The opening brief challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on two elements: malicious intent and proof that each count caused property damage exceeding $400 — the statutory threshold for felony treatment under § 594(b)(1). The Court of Appeal applied the substantial-evidence standard and concluded a rational jury could find both elements satisfied on the trial record.

Issue: Whether substantial evidence supported the malicious-intent and $400-damage elements of two felony-vandalism counts under Penal Code § 594
Posture: Defendant/appellant on direct appeal from felony convictions
Standard: Substantial evidence
Result: Affirmed (Sept. 17, 2025)
Citation: Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div. Four, No. B340902
Why this issue mattered: Mr. Li was facing the difference between a misdemeanor and two felony convictions — a difference that follows a person for the rest of his life in housing, employment, immigration consequences, and how the world treats him. The $400 line in § 594 separates those two futures, and the malice element is almost always proved circumstantially. Every defendant is entitled to have the State held to its proof on each element, and to have someone in the Court of Appeal who treats his liberty and his record as worth fighting for. As appointed appellate counsel, that obligation does not depend on the outcome.

Read the Court of Appeal opinion (PDF) →

Court of Appeal · Affirmed Second District · Division Three

Cagle v. Armour — affirmance of CCP § 128.7 sanctions order

Represented Tibrea Cagle and her trial counsel in a Court of Appeal challenge to a monetary sanctions order entered under Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7 in a motor-vehicle negligence action. The trial court found the action had been maintained without an evidentiary basis after defendant served a safe-harbor motion, and awarded sanctions equal to defendant's attorney's fees and costs in bringing the motion. The Court of Appeal applied abuse-of-discretion review, concluded the trial court's findings were supported by the record, and affirmed.

Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding § 128.7 sanctions after the safe-harbor period expired without withdrawal of the pleading
Posture: Plaintiff and counsel/appellants from monetary sanctions order
Standard: Abuse of discretion · § 128.7
Result: Affirmed (Sept. 12, 2024)
Citation: Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div. Three, No. B334400
Why this issue mattered: Ms. Cagle came to court as a plaintiff in a vehicle case and left it with a sanctions order on her record — a finding that, in the eyes of any future judge or jury, says her claim should never have been brought. Section 128.7 sanctions, once entered, are reviewed with heavy deference, and a fee-shifting order against a plaintiff and her counsel travels with both of them for a long time. A person who believes she was wronged is entitled to a real chance to be heard before that judgment is fixed to her name. Asking the Court of Appeal to look hard at how the safe harbor was applied to her, and at what the trial court demanded of her in 21 days, was about defending her standing to tell her own story.

Read the Court of Appeal opinion (PDF) →

If you are evaluating an appeal that looks difficult on the merits or on the standard of review, that is exactly the conversation we want to have. We will tell you honestly what we think the chances are — and whether the issue is worth bringing anyway.

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